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Abstract
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social
choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computa-
tional approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and
behavior of voters.
In a recent paper, Meir et al. [15] made another step in this direction,
by suggesting a behavioral game-theoretic model for voters under uncer-
tainty. For a specific variation of best-response heuristics, they proved
initial existence and convergence results in the Plurality voting system.
In this paper, we extend the model in multiple directions, considering
voters with different uncertainty levels, simultaneous strategic decisions,
and a more permissive notion of best-response. We prove that a voting
equilibrium exists even in the most general case. Further, any society
voting in an iterative setting is guaranteed to converge.
We also analyze an alternative behavior where voters try to minimize
their worst-case regret. We show that the two behaviors coincide in the
simple setting of Meir et al., but not in the general case.
1 Introduction
Suppose that your favorite candidate in the elections trails behind in the polls.
A game-theorist advice in such a case would be to “vote strategically.”
As a simple example, consider an election with 3 candidates M = {a, b, c}.
Suppose that the most recent poll indicates that a is leading with 45% of the
votes, whereas there are 40% for b and 15% for c (see Fig. 1). A voter who
prefers c over b over a may conclude that c has no chance of winning, and thus
a wise strategic decision would be to vote for b. However, there is no con-
sensus whatsoever regarding how to generalize this observation to an arbitrary
situation, or even on the conditions under which c should be deserted.
This lack of a conclusive notion for strategic voting is partly due to the fact
that there are many ways to describe the information voters have, as well as
their beliefs over other voters’ preferences and actions when casting their vote.
Moreover, even for a given belief there may be several different actions that can
be justified as rational. Hence any model of voting behavior and equilibrium
must state explicitly its epistemic and behavioral assumptions.
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We can of course apply some “standard” assumptions from game-theory,
for example that voters play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by their
preferences. However, such a prediction turns out to be very uninformative: a
single voter can rarely affect the outcome, and thus almost any way the voters
vote is a Nash equilibrium (including, for example, when all voters vote for their
least preferred candidate).
It is therefore natural to consider the role of uncertainty in voters’ decisions.
One of the most prominent models for voting under uncertainty was suggested
by Myerson and Weber [19], where voters preferences are sampled from a known
prior distribution. An equilibrium according to the MW model is a mapping
from preferences to a distribution over votes, such that each voter maximizes
her expected utility w.r.t. this distribution. Myerson and Weber prove via
a fixed-point argument that an equilibrium always exists for every positional
scoring rule, and in particular for Plurality.
The MW model reflects a classical economic approach (as do many other
game-theoretic models of voting), but its epistemic and behavioral assumptions
seem highly unreasonable in the context of voting. As studies in behavioral
psychology show, human decision makers often ignore probabilistic information
even when it is given, employing various heuristics instead [23]. It is thus
unlikely that people are able to represent such complex distributions, or to
compute and optimize their own expected utility, let alone the equilibria of the
game.
In a recent effort to reconcile well-founded decision making approaches with a
formal game-theoretic analysis, Meir et al. [15] suggested a model for Plurality
voting relying on strict uncertainty and local dominance. Informally, voters’
beliefs can be described by a single vector of candidates’ scores. This prospective
score vector may be the result of a poll, derived from acquaintance with the other
voters, from the outcome of a previous round of voting, etc. Each voter has a
single uncertainty parameter, reflecting how sure she is in the correctness of the
prospective scores—higher uncertainty means the voter considers a larger range
of outcomes (score vectors) as “possible”. In the example introduced above, a
voter with an intermediate uncertainty parameter will consider a tie between a
and b as “possible,” but will reject any outcome where c can win as impossible.
Given this uncertain, non-probabilistic view, it is not a-priori clear how a
voter should act. Meir et al. adopted one of the classic approaches to decision
making under strict uncertainty, assuming that a voter i will refrain from voting
for a candidate ai that is locally dominated by another candidate a
′
i [1, 2].
Intuitively, a′i locally-dominates ai if it is always at least as good, and sometimes
strictly better, to vote for a′i than for ai (taking into account all score vectors
that voter i considers possible). A voting equilibrium is simply a state where no
voter votes for a locally-dominated candidate according to her beliefs. Going
back to our example, our voter will consider candidate c as locally-dominated
by candidate b, and will thus strategize by voting for b.
Informally, Meir et al. [15] proved that if all voters have the same uncertainty
parameter, start from the truthful state, and play one at a time, then they always
converge to a voting equilibrium. In the special case of zero uncertainty, this
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simply means that the best-response dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium
(which is known from [17]).
However, these assumptions are rather restrictive. Some voters may be less
informed than others, or simply more “stubborn” (e.g., require even fewer votes
to c in order to be convinced it cannot win). Also, there is no reason to believe
that voters initially vote for their most preferred candidate, or that only one
voter changes her vote after each poll or voting round (see, e.g., [20]). Meir et
al. [15] showed empirically that convergence occurs even without those assump-
tions, and conjectured that at least some of the assumptions could be relaxed.
However they provide no formal guarantee for such convergence,and in fact for
voters with different uncertainty levels even existence of equilibrium remains an
open question.
1.1 Research goals
The main purpose of this work is to close this gap, and to prove equilibrium
existence and convergence under conditions that are as broad as possible.
While we adopt the model of Meir et al. at large, we study a non-atomic
variation of it, where the effect of any single voter is negligible (as in [19]). This
simplifies the model, and allows us to prove stronger results when arbitrary
subsets of voters change their vote simultaneously. However all of our results
hold in the finite case, for voters that move one-at-a-time (see Appendix VIII).
We modify the distance function used to determine the possible ranges of candi-
dates’ scores, to one that is better justified by psychological studies (for details
see Footnote 3).
In addition, we are interested whether the behavioral assumptions can be
weakened, or, alternatively, be replaced with a more nuanced way to select
among several undominated candidates. To that end, we define a variation of
the model where voters are aiming to minimize their worst-case regret over all
states they believe possible, and compare this behavior to voting under local-
dominance.
1.2 Our contribution
Our main result is proving that voters with local-dominance behavior always
converge to an equilibrium. This holds for any mixture of types (including voters
with different uncertainty levels), for any initial voting profile, and for any order
of moves (including moves of arbitrary subsets of voters, and suboptimal moves).
We then turn to study voters minimizing worst-case regret. When voters
have the same uncertainty level and start from the truthful profile, we show
that regret minimization coincides with local dominance. However if these re-
quirements are relaxed then the behaviors may significantly differ, and even the
existence of equilibrium is not guaranteed.
3
2 The Formal Model
Basic notations Where possible, we follow the notations and definitions of
[15]. We make the necessary changes to adapt their model to nonatomic voters.
We denote [x] = {1, 2, . . . , x} for all x ∈ N. For a finite set A, ∆(A) denotes
the set of all probability distributions over A (all non-negative vectors of size
|A| that sum to 1).
The set of candidates is denoted by M , where m = |M |. Let Q = π(M) be
the set of all strict orders (permutations) overM . We encode all the information
on a voter, including her preferences, in her type,1 where the set of all types is
denoted by V .
Thus a voter of type v ∈ V has preferences Qv ∈ Q, where Qv(a) ∈ [m] is
the rank of candidate a ∈ M (lower is better), and qv = Q−1v (1) is her most-
preferred candidate. We denote a ≻v b if Qv(a) < Qv(b).
We do not have a finite set of voters. Rather, a preference profile Q ∈ ∆(Q)
is a distribution over preferences, specifying the fraction of voters with each
preference order. A population V ∈ ∆(V) is a distribution over types, that
is, a preference profile aggregated with any additional information specified by
voters’ types (e.g., their beliefs and behaviors).
Under the Plurality rule, every voter selects a single candidate. Intuitively,
we should specify how many voters of each type vote for every candidate.
Formally, an action profile (also called state) a is a refinement of V, where
a(v, c) ∈ R+ denotes the fraction of voters of type v who vote for c ∈ M . Our
next definitions are intended to enable notations and analysis that are similar
to those used in the atomic case.
Since a single voter has negligible influence, we only consider moves by sub-
sets of voters whose size is a multiple of ǫ (for some arbitrarily small ǫ). All
voters in each set have the same type and move simultaneously (although they
need not be aware of this, see also Appendix IX). We denote by I the collection
of these 1/ǫ sets. Since all voters in set i ∈ I are indistinguishable we refer to
“voter i” which is an arbitrary voter in the set i. This voter has a well-defined
type vi and a well defined action ai in every action profile a.
Winner determination and tie-breaking The outcome of the Plurality
rule in state a, denoted f(a) ∈ M , only depends on the total number of votes
for each candidate. We thus define the score vector sa induced by action profile
a. That is, sa(c) =
∑
v∈V a(v, c) = |{i ∈ I : ai = c}|ǫ. We will use a and sa
interchangeably, sometimes omitting the subscript a. We denote by S = Rm+
the set of all score vectors. We also sometimes refer to score vectors as states,
although s may not be attained from an actual action profile. E.g., it is possible
that
∑
c∈M s(c) 6= 1. Note that we may only use s in a context where voters’
identifiers are not important.
Note that changing the vote of a single voter in a does not change a or sa,
yet we need a way to settle tie-breaking. Every score vector s implicitly contains
1We later extend the definition of a type to also include the belief structure and behavior
of the voter.
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an arbitrary “tie-breaker” Q+
s
∈ Q.
The winner f(s) is the candidate c ∈ M whose score s(c) is maximal. If
there is more than one candidate with maximal score, we break ties according to
Q+
s
. Formally, f(s) = argminc∈argmax s(c′)Q
+
s
(c). Note that the outcome is well
defined even for score vectors that are not derived from valid action profiles.
Dynamics and equilibria We describe the behavior of a voter of type v ∈ V
by a response function gv : M × S → 2M \ ∅. That is, a mapping from the
current state (only taking into account aggregate scores) and current action, to
a subset of actions. Together, Qv and gv completely define the type v. For an
identified voter i ∈ I, we write gi(s) instead of gvi(ai, s). We also write gi(a)
as a shorthand for gi(sa). Intuitively, this means that a voter i ∈ I may choose
any action in gi(a). In the terms of [11], gi is a historyless, non-deterministic
response function.
Definition 1. A voting equilibrium for populationV is a state a, where gi(a) =
{ai} for all i ∈ I.
For example, if gi is the best-response function (gi(a) = {c ∈M : c maximizes the utility of i in a}
for all i), then a voting equilibria coincides with the Nash equilibria of the game.
We emphasize that classic results on existence of equilibria in nonatomic games
(e.g., [22]) do not apply, since even if we assign cardinal utilities to voters, those
would be highly discontinuous in the action profile. Note that as in [19], we
do not assume that voters with the same type, or even the same identifier, are
coordinated.
Even in cases where an equilibrium exists, players may or may not reach
one, depending on their initial state and the order in which they play. We are
therefore interested in sufficient conditions under which the game is acyclic, i.e.
there are no finite cycles of rational moves by groups of any size.2
3 Uncertainty and Strategic Voting
The most important part of the model is of course the way we define the be-
havior, which is the response function gi. This behavior depends on voters’
preferences, and also on their beliefs about the current state. We assume voters
derive their beliefs using a distance-based strict uncertainty model, following
[15].
3.1 Distance-based uncertainty
Suppose we have some distance measure for score vectors, denoted by δ(s, s′).
For any s, let S(s, x) ⊆ S be the set of vectors that are at distance at most x from
s. Formally, S(s, x) = {s′ : δ(s, s′) ≤ x}. A distance function δ is candidate-
wise if it can be written as δ(s, s′) = maxc∈M δ
′(sc, s
′
c) for some monotone
2In finite games, acyclicity and guaranteed convergence imply one another. In nonatomic
games the relation is a bit more delicate, see Appendix IX.
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a b c
s(a) = 0.45
s(b) = 0.4
s(c) = 0.15
a b c
Figure 1: On the left figure we see a given state s, which can be thought of as
the result of a poll, or of the current voting round. On the right we depict the
set of possible states S(s, r) for r = 0.15. Any s′ is a possible state as long as
the score of each candidate is in the marked range. The dashed line marks the
threshold above which a candidate is considered a possible winner.
function δ′ (meaning that for a fixed s, δ′(s, s′) is nondecreasing in |s − s′|).
Thus s′ ∈ S(s, x) only if the score of every candidate in s′ is sufficiently close to
its score in s, see Fig. 1.
In [15], several metrics have been suggested, including various ℓd norms
and the earth-mover distance. Among those the multiplicative distance (where
δ′(s, s′) = max{s′/s, s/s′}− 1) and the ℓ∞ metric (where δ
′(s, s′) = |s− s′|) are
candidate-wise.
While all of our results apply for any candidate-wise distance, for con-
creteness we assume throughout the paper the multiplicative distance. Note
that the multiplicative distance is independent of the amount of voters, i.e.
δ(s, s′) = δ(αs, αs′) for all α > 0. This is consistent with findings on how
people perceive uncertainty over numerical values [13, 23].3
We define the uncertainty parameter rv ∈ R+ as part the agent’s type (will
be later used to construct the response function gv). Given a profile a, voter
i ∈ I believes that the actual state may be any s′ ∈ S(sa, ri), where ri = rvi .
Note that the distance between two score vectors that only differ by the tie-
breaker is 0. Thus if several candidates C ⊆M are tied in s = sa with maximal
score, for each c ∈ C there is a state s′ ∈ S(s, ri) where f(s′) = c (any state
where Q+
s
′(c) = 1), and this holds for any ri.
3For example, the studies show that if the average number of girls born daily in a hospital
is s, then people believe that the probability that on a given day the number is within [(1 −
r)s, (1 + r)s] is fixed and does not depend on s. Kahneman and Tversky highlight that this
reasoning stands in contrast to the scientific truth in this case, where the range r is proportional
to 1/
√
s. In our case we can think of the score of a candidate as the limit of a Poisson variable
(rather than Binomial in the hospital example), and thus the range [s/(1+r), s(1+r)] is more
appropriate.
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A voter facing strict uncertainty may use various heuristics when selecting a
strategy. In this work we follow two standard approaches: avoiding dominated
strategies [2], and minimizing worst-case regret [21, 10].
Voter influence In the nonatomic case, every voter has negligible influence.
However, this influence is not perceived by the voter as zero, as otherwise voters
would always be indifferent about their actions. We define f(s, c) to be the
outcome that a voter expects under score vector s, when voting for c. Intuitively,
the extra vote c decides the winner if several candidates are tied with maximal
score in s (overriding the default tie-breaker Q+
s
), and otherwise has no effect.
A more formal definition appears in Appendix X.
3.2 Local dominance
The first approach we consider follows [5, 15], where voting dynamics is deter-
mined by local dominance relations.
Consider a particular voter of identifier i = 〈vi, ai〉. Let S = S(s, ri). We
say that action ai S-beats bi if there is at least one state s
′ ∈ S s.t. f(s′, ai) ≻i
f(s′, bi). That is where i strictly prefers f(s
′, ai) over f(s
′, bi). Action ai S-
dominates bi if (I) ai S-beats bi; and (II) bi does not S-beat ai.
We next define the response function that strategic voters apply under the
local-dominance behavioral model. Consider a voter i, where vi = 〈Qi, ri〉.
Definition 2 (Strategic move under local dominance (LD)). Let ai be the vote
of i in profile a. Let D ⊆M be the set of candidates that S(a, ri)-dominate ai,
and that are not S(a, ri)-dominated. If D = ∅ then gi(a) = {ai}. Otherwise:
• For a weak LD voter, gi(a) = D.
• For a strict LD voter, gi(a) = argmind∈D Qi(d).
In other words, a strict LD voter votes the most preferred candidate that
locally-dominates her current choice (if such exists), which is almost identical
to the definition in [15] for finite populations (see also Def. 5 in Appendix). The
definition of a weak LD voter is much more permissive, and does not restrict
the voter to select the most preferred candidate in D. A higher value of ri
may either indicate that the voter is less informed, or simply that she requires
stronger evidence that a move will be beneficial, a tendency we can interpret as
stronger loss aversion [12].
As in the model of [15], we get the following immediate observation.
Proposition 1. Let V be a population of LD voters. A profile a is a voting
equilibrium iff ∀i ∈ I, !∃a′i ∈ M, such that a
′
i S(a, ri)-dominates ai. I.e., if no
voter votes for a locally dominated candidate.
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4 Convergence with LD Voters
4.1 Strategic responses and possible winners
We say that candidate c is a possible winner for i in state s if there is a possible
state where c wins. Formally, Wi(s) = {c ∈M : ∃s′ ∈ S(s, ri) s.t. f(s′, c) = c}.
Also denote W0(s) = {c ∈ M : f(s, c) = c} = Wi(s) for ri = 0, and Wi(s) =
Wi(sa).
It is easy to see that under the multiplicative distance c ∈ Wi(s) iff s(c) ≥
(1 + ri)
−2s(f(s)) (see dashed line in Fig. 1), and that similar thresholds exist
for other metrics (see also Lemma 3 in [16]).
Lemma 2. Every pair of possible winners are tied in some possible state. For-
mally, for every b, c ∈Wi(s), there is s′ ∈ S(s, ri) s.t. b, c ∈W0(s′).
Proof. Consider some b, c ∈Wi(s). For the multiplicative distance, let the score
of all candidates except b, c be s′(a) = s(a)/(1 + ri), and set s
′(b) = s′(c) =
min{s(b), s(c)}(1 + ri). Then s′ ∈ S(s, ri), and s′(b) = s′(c) ≥ s′(a) for all
a ∈M .
We denote by ai
i
→ a′i valid local dominance steps where a
′
i ∈ gi(a) and
a′i 6= ai. The next two lemmas characterize such LD moves.
Lemma 3. Consider an LD move ai
i
→ a′i. Then either (a) ai /∈ Wi(s); or (b)
ai ≺i b for all b ∈Wi(s); or (c) ri = 0, {ai, a′i} ⊆W0(s) and a
′
i ≻i ai.
Proof. Suppose that ai, b ∈ Wi(a), and ai ≻i b (i.e., (a) and (b) are violated).
Assume first that a′i /∈ W0(s). By Lemma 2 there is a state s
′ ∈ S(s, ri) where
ai, b have maximal score (possibly with other candidates), strictly above a
′
i.
W.l.o.g. Q+
s
′(b) < Q
+
s
′(ai), as the tie-breaker does not affect the distance. Thus
f(s′, ai) = ai, f(s
′, a′i) = b. Since ai ≻i b, then we have that ai S(a, ri)-beats
a′i.
The remaining case is where a′i ∈ W0(s) and ai ≻i a
′
i. Then in the state s
′
where ai, a
′
i are tied it is better to vote for ai. In either case we get that a
′
i /∈ D,
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Consider an LD move ai
i
→ a′i. Then
1. a′i ∈Wi(s), and there is some c ∈ Wi(s) s.t. a
′
i ≻i c.
2. For a strict LD move, a′i = argminc∈Wi(a)Qi(c).
3. If ai /∈Wi(s), then |gi(s)| = 1 (thus weak and strict LD coincide).
Part 1 is the only thing we need for our later convergence results, and its
proof is immediate: Consider a∗i = argminc∈Wi(a)Qi(c). Clearly a
∗
i locally
dominates any candidate not in Wi(a), thus a
′
i ∈ Wi(s). If there is only one
possible winner, no action dominates any other action, and there are no moves.
Part 2 is the nonatomic analog of Lemma 5.1 in [15], however our proof is
simpler (see Appendix XI).
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The above lemmas show that a strict LD move boils down to a simple heuris-
tics: vote for the most preferred candidate among those whose score is above
the threshold. For a weak LD move, any candidate above the threshold except
the least preferred can be selected.
4.2 Existence of equilibrium and convergence
Suppose that voters start at some arbitrary state a0, and play repeatedly. We
get a sequence of states a0, a1, . . . where in every iteration some arbitrary subset
of voters may change their vote. That is, for any t ∈ N and any i ∈ I, either
at+1i ∈ gi(a
t), or at+1i = a
t
i. Our primary result states that voters always
converge in the nonatomic model (see Appendix VIII for a proof and discussion
of the finite case).4
Theorem 5. Any sequence of weak LD moves is finite.
Proof. We only need to show that no valid sequence may contain a cycle (see Ap-
pendix IX). Assume, toward a contradiction, that there is a cyclic path (at)Tt=0,
and denote by R ⊆ M all candidates that are part of the cycle. Let s∗ be the
lowest score of any candidate in R during the cycle, w.l.o.g. candidate a∗ ∈ R
at time t∗. Thus s∗ = st
∗
(a∗) ≤ st(c) for all c ∈ R for every time t ≤ T .
Consider the next step where some voters join a∗ (w.l.o.g. at step t∗), and pick
an arbitrary voter j ∈ I s.t. a∗ = at
∗+1
j 6= a
t∗
j . Thus at step t
∗ there is a move
aj
j
→ a∗ where aj = a
t+1
j ∈ R.
By Lemma 4, a∗ is a possible winner for voter j, i.e., a∗ ∈ Wj(st
∗
). Since
st
∗
(c) ≥ st
∗
(a∗) for all c ∈ R, we have R ⊆ Wj(at
∗
), and in particular aj ∈
Wj(a
t∗).
By Lemma 3, either aj is the least-preferred candidate for j in Wj(s
t∗)
(Cases I and II below), or the third category of the lemma holds. We treat the
latter case separately (Case III), so assume aj is indeed the least-preferred in
Wj(s
t∗). Since R ⊆Wj(at
∗
), aj is the least-preferred in R as well.
There must be some step t∗∗ in the cycle where a voter of type vj moves
to aj (w.l.o.g. voter j). So in s
t∗∗ , aj is preferred by j to some other possible
winner z by Lemma 4. Since aj is the least-preferred in R, and aj ≻j z, we
have that z ∈ Wj(st
∗∗
) \R. Denote the (fixed) score of z by s(z).
Case I: s(z) ≥ s∗. Consider again step t∗. Since s(z) ≥ s∗, we have z ∈
Wj(s
t∗). Since aj is the least preferred possible winner in t
∗, we have that
z ≻j aj , which is a contradiction.
Case II: s(z) < s∗. Denote d = at
∗∗
j , and consider the step d
j
→ aj at time
t∗∗. Since d ∈ R then st
∗∗
(d) ≥ s∗ > s(z), and thus d ∈ Wj(st
∗∗
). By Lemma 3
(category (b) or (c)), we have that aj ≻j d. This is a contradiction since aj is
the least-preferred in R.
4We assume strict preference orders for consistency with most of the social-choice literature.
However we note that the theorem applies also under weak preferences. Indeed, introducing
indifference in the preference relation only eliminate LD moves, and therefore never creates a
cycle.
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Case III: The remaining case is when there is b ∈Wj(st
∗
) s.t. aj ≻j b. Then
by Lemma 3, a∗ ∈ W0(st
∗
). However since a∗ has minimal score, this means
that R ⊆ W0(st
∗
), i.e., all candidates in the cycle have the same score s∗ at
time t∗. Then all of R must have the same score at every time t, since if the
score of some candidates goes up, the score of others must go down below the
minimum s∗. This means that all of the moves in the cycle fall under categories
(b) or (c) of Lemma 3. Thus voters only vote for more preferred candidates,
which contradicts a cycle.
One can argue that the uncertainty level of a voter may not remain the same
throughout the game. For example, there may be less uncertainty as the game
advances. We note that our proof still goes through (and thus Theorem 5 holds)
even if Wj(s
t∗) and Wj(s
t∗∗) are obtained via different values of rj .
The above theorem proves convergence under very broad conditions, but
does not provide much intuition as to what happens along the converging path.
Our next result shows that when all voters have the same uncertainty level,
convergence is much more structured. Our result extends a similar result in [15]
for the finite model, but note that in our model convergence is guaranteed even
when subsets of voters move simultaneously.
Conveniently, when all voters has the same uncertainty r, at any state at
there is just one agreed set of possible winners, denoted by W t = W (at). We
say that a move ai
i
→ a′i is an opportunity move if a
′
i ≻i ai, and otherwise it is
a compromise move.
Proposition 6. Consider any non-atomic Plurality voting game with weak LD
moves, where all voters have the same uncertainty level r. If a0 is the truthful
state, then for all t: (A) W t+1 ⊆ W t; (B) the score of the winner is non-
decreasing; (C) there are only compromise moves; and (D) any ati is either the
most preferred candidate for i in W t, or it is not in W t.
The proposition still holds if the uncertainty level r decreases over time.
5 Regret Minimization
The local dominance approach is appropriate to describe voters who are reluc-
tant to change their vote, unless they know it cannot hurt them, a behavior
that is consistent with loss aversion. A different approach to decision making
under strict uncertainty is minimization of worst case regret, explained by risk
aversion [3]. Intuitively, such a voter wants to avoid situations in which she
could have significantly improved her utility, but failed to be pivotal.
On one hand, regret minimization is simpler than local-dominance since it
does not depend on the current vote. Thus we can write gv(s),Wv(s) rather
than gi(s),Wi(s). On the other hand, regret may depend on cardinal utilities,
rather than ordinal preferences.
A cardinal utility scale is a generic function u : M → R, where u(a) 6= u(b)
for all a 6= b. A cardinal utility scale u fits order Q ∈ π(M), if u(a) > u(b)
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whenever Q(a) < Q(b). We thus augment the definition of a type v with a
cardinal utility scale uv that fits Qv.
Formally, the regret of a type v voter for voting b in state s′ is REGv(s
′, b) =
maxc∈M u(f(s
′, c))− u(f(s′, b)). Note that REGv(s′, b) ≥ 0.
The worst case regret (WCR) of i ∈ I for voting b in s is WCRv(s, b) =
maxs′∈S(s,rv)REGv(s
′, b).
Definition 3 (Strategic move under regret minimization). A WCR voter of
type v in profile a votes for a candidate b minimizing WCRv(sa, b).
We first characterize WCR moves. We show that (under a candidate-wise
distance) we can effectively ignore the cardinal utility scale, as only the prefer-
ence order affects the vote.
Lemma 7. Either |Wv(s)| = 1 (in which case all regrets are 0); or the unique
candidate minimizing WCRv(s, c) is a
∗ = argminc∈Wv(s)Qi(c).
From Lemmas 4 and 7, we get that regret minimization provides a partial
justification for the strict variant of LD moves.
Corollary 8. Let ai
i
→ a′i be a strict LD move in state s, then a
′
i is the WCR
response of type vi, i.e., the unique candidate c minimizing WCRri(s, c).
This does not mean that the WCR dynamics and the strict LD dynamics
coincide: in an arbitrary state a it is possible that ai is a possible winner that
is undominated (and hence i will not move under LD), yet there is another
possible winner a′i ≻i ai (and hence i will move to a
′
i under WCR).
It is an open question whether a WCR game where all voters have the same
r is acyclic, yet if we add another restriction then we get that WCR moves
coincide with LD moves, and in particular must converge.
Proposition 9. Consider any non-atomic Plurality voting game, where all vot-
ers have the same uncertainty level r. If a0 is the truthful state (and |Wr(a
0)| ≥
2), then for every time t and any i ∈ I, the WCR move and the strict LD move
of i coincide. In particular, the WCR dynamics converges to an equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any agent i ∈ I. By property (D) of Proposition 6, we have
that either ati /∈ Wr(s
t), or ati is the best possible winner. In the first case, by
Lemma 4, there is a strict LD move, and by Corollary 8, this move coincides
with the WCR move.
In the latter case, there is no LD move for i (so at+1i = a
t
i under LD), and
by Lemma 7, ati minimizes worst case regret (so a
t+1
i = a
t
i under WCR).
Finally, since the LD dynamics converges, we get that under the conditions
of the proposition (same r, truthful initial state), WCR converges as well.
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Diverse population For the local-dominance dynamics, Theorem 5 shows
that any game is acyclic. Since under regret minimization voters are more
likely to have a strategic move, it is also more likely that cycles emerge, and
even the existence of an equilibrium is not guaranteed (see Appendix XII for
proof).
Proposition 10. There is a voting game where no voting equilibrium exists
under WCR dynamics.
6 Discussion and Related Work
We refer the reader to [15], which surveyed many game-theoretic models of
voting equilibrium, in particular w.r.t. various approaches to uncertainty and
dominance. In addition, Meir et al. showed via extensive simulations that the
equilibria reached by LD voters reproduce patterns observed in the real world,
such as Duverger’s Law [6].
Other concepts similar to local-dominance moves have been recently intro-
duced in the voting literature, notably Π-manipulation [5, 20] and ’de re’ ma-
nipulation [24]. However these papers did not consider distance metrics and did
not present any results on equilibrium existence or convergence.
Voting behavior based on regret minimization was considered by Ferejohn
and Fiorina [8]. However their model (like probability-based models) heavily
relies on voters having cardinal utilities. Also, they take an extreme approach
where voters do not use any available information, and thus all states are con-
sidered possible. Another regret-based model was suggested in [18], which also
ignores any available information. Merril shows that under the Plurality rule
uncertain voters should be truthful, which stands in sharp contrast to behavior
observed in the real world.
We see our regret minimization model as a non-probabilistic variation of
the Myerson and Weber model [19]. Specifically, in the MW model the voter
considers the probability of each tie to conclude her expected utility. In our
WCR model the voter focuses on the most significant possible tie, which greatly
facilitates the decision making process.
Voting experiments suggest that human voting behavior is consistent with
regret minimization [4, 14], though voters may not see themselves as such. We
should note that these studies have limited relevance to our work since they
concern the decision whether to vote (voter turnout), rather than the strategic
decision what to vote. Thus more experimentation is required to test the validity
of such models.
A related approach is iterated regret minimization [9], which was recently
applied to voting [7]. This approach assumes that voters know exactly both the
preferences and the decision making process of the other voters, whereas both
of these assumptions are avoided in the models we studied.
A recent result on memoryless dynamics in atomic games, suggests that in
any game with more than one pure equilibrium, cycles must occur if arbitrary
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groups of agents can move simultaneously [11]. Our result shows that this is
no longer true in nonatomic games, and in fact there is a large class of games
where convergence is guaranteed despite the existence of multiple equilibria.
6.1 Conclusion and Future Directions
We showed that in the Plurality voting system, voters who avoid locally-dominated
candidates will always converge to an equilibrium, and that this result is robust
to the uncertainty levels in the populations, the initial state, and the order in
which voters or groups of voters play.
Convergence rate In finite games without uncertainty, it is known that con-
vergence must occur in polynomial time in the number of voters and candidates.
The speed of convergence in non-atomic games is not easily defined. For exam-
ple agents can just move in smaller and smaller masses in an infinite (acyclic)
path. However one can ask if there is a bound on the maximal number of times
a single voter can move. For example under the conditions of Prop. 6, any voter
can move at most m − 1 times, so we can say that convergence is “fast.” Our
general convergence proof does not provide a bound of such sort, but we be-
lieve it is an interesting open question for future research. We conjecture that
no agent should move more than a polynomial (in m) number of times until
convergence occurs.
Justifying best-response Consider the assumption made in [15], that among
all candidates dominating her current action, a voter will always select the one
that is most preferred. Our paper tackles this assumption in two ways. First,
we show that it is not required for convergence, and can thus be relaxed (among
the other restrictions we relax). Second, we show that this assumption can be
justified on the grounds that it minimizes the worst case regret of the voter.
Experimental validation
Other voting rules While the definition of weak LD voters naturally extends
to many other voting rules (as do the definitions in [5, 20, 24]), the action
space in most rules contains all permutations of M , and there may be many
actions that dominate a particular action. Thus the mere definitions are not very
instructive as to how a voter would act. We hope the (local) worst-case regret
minimization approach will be useful in defining reasonable voting behaviors
under uncertainty for other voting rules. Finally, distance based uncertainty
may prove useful in other games where there is a natural metric over action
profiles.
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VII Characterization of LD moves
Proposition 6. Consider any non-atomic Plurality voting game with weak LD
moves, where all voters have the same uncertainty level r. If a0 is the truthful
state, then for all t: (A) W t+1 ⊆ W t; (B) the score of the winner is non-
decreasing; (C) there are only compromise moves; and (D) any ati is either the
most preferred candidate for i in W t, or it is not in W t.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one from [15]. Since the game is non-
atomic the proof is somewhat simpler and also applies to group-moves. In
contrast to [15] (who focused on the ℓ1 metric), our proof also holds for weak
LD moves under candidate-wise metrics.
We show that by induction on t, all properties (A-D) hold. This clearly
holds in t = 0, since a0i = qi. Now, consider some move from a
t to at+1. By the
induction hypothesis all properties hold until at.
Consider any move ati
i
→ at+1i for some i ∈ I. If this is the first move
of voter i, then clearly this is a compromise move. Otherwise, since ati is the
most preferred candidate of i in some W t
′
, t′ < t, and at+1i ∈ W
t ⊆ W t
′
,
then ati ≻i a
t+1
i , which shows (C). By Lemma 4, a
t+1
i ∈ W
t. Since ati ≻i a
t+1
i ,
categories (b) and (c) of Lemma 3 are impossible, thus category (a) applies, and
ati /∈W
t. In particular ati 6= f(a
t), thus neither (A) nor (B) are violated at time
t.
Finally, by Lemma 4 at+1i is the most preferred in W
t. Since W t+1 ⊆ W t,
(D) holds as well.
The proposition still holds if the uncertainty level r decreases over time, but
not if it can grow (since then it may occur that W t+1 *W t).
VIII Atomic voters
Basic notations We denote [x] = {1, 2, . . . , x}. The set of candidates is
denoted by M , respectively, where m = |M |. Let π(M) be the set of all orders
over M .
There is a finite set of voters I of size n. A preference profile Q ∈ π(M)n
is a collection over preferences, where Qi is the preference order of voter i ∈ I.
We denote by vi the type of voter i, which includes her preferences and possibly
other information on her beliefs and behavior. Thus a population V = (vi)i∈I
specifies the types of all voters. For a vector x = (xj)j∈I , we denote by x−i the
partial vector that includes all entries except xi.
We denote a ≻i b if Qi(a) < Qi(b).
An action profile (a.k.a. state) is a vector a = (ai)i∈I , where ai ∈ M is the
candidate that voter i votes for.
The Plurality voting rule f allows voters to vote for a single candidate from
the set M . Then, f chooses the candidate with the highest score. Thus any
population defines a game, where voters’ types determine their utilities. The
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outcome of the Plurality rule only depends on the total number of votes for each
candidate. Formally, we define the score vector sa induced by action profile a,
as sa(c) =
∑
i∈I:ai=c
wi, where wi = 1 for all i (compare with the corresponding
definition in the nonatomic case).
Every score vector s implicitly contains an arbitrary “tie-breaker” Q+
s
∈ Q.
The winner f(s) is the candidate c ∈ M whose score s(c) is maximal if such
a candidate is unique. Otherwise we break ties according to Q+
s
, thus f(s) =
argminc∈argmax s(c)Q
+
s
(c). An alternative (but equivalent) way to compute the
winner in the atomic case, is to think of the tie breaker as if it adds a small
fraction to the score of each candidate. Formally, f(s) = argmaxc∈M (s(c) +
m+1−Q+
s
(c)
m+1 ).
Dynamics We describe the behavior of a voter i ∈ I by a response function
gi : S → 2M \ ∅. That is, a mapping from the current state to a subset of valid
actions. In contrast to the atomic case, the state (score vector) considered by
voter i does not contain her own action. Thus gi(a) is a shorthand for gi(sa−i),
and a voter i ∈ I may choose any action in gi(a). Together, Qi and gi completely
define the type vi of voter i.
For example, gi can be the best-response function: gi(a) = argminc∈M Qi(f(a−i, c)).
Definition 4. Let V be a population of voters. A voting equilibrium is a state
a, where gi(a) = {ai} for all i ∈ I.
For example, if gi is the best-response function (or better-response, which
is set-valued), then a voting equilibria coincides with the Nash equilibria of the
atomic game.
Local dominance The set Si(s, x) is exactly as in the nonatomic case, i.e.
S(s, x) = {s′ : δ(s, s′) ≤ x},
however for a profile a, Si(a, x) = Si(sa−i , x). In particular, and in contrast
to the nonatomic case, two voters of the same type may consider different sets
of possible states, if they happen to vote for different candidates in a. For the
multiplicative metric, s′(c) is in the range [⌊s(c)/(1 + x)⌋ , ⌈s(c)(1 + x)⌉].
We define the uncertainty parameter ri ∈ R+ as part of the type vi. Given
a prospective state s, voter i believes that the actual state may be any s′ ∈
Si(a, ri).
Since s′ also does not contain the vote of i, the winner that i considers in s′
depends on her vote ai. That is, f(s
′, ai) is the winner of the profile s
′ where
ai gets one additional vote. Note that in the nonatomic case, the vote ai is
assumed to break any ties, and the tie breaker Q+
s
′ is only considered if ai is not
a candidate with maximal score. In contrast, in the atomic case ai simply adds
one vote to s(ai), and then we apply Q
+
s
to resolve any ties. Thus if several
candidates C ⊆ M are tied in (s, ai) with maximal score, each of them wins in
some possible state.
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Definition 5 (Strategic move under local dominance for finite populations).
Let ai be the vote of i in profile a. Let D ⊆ M be the set of candidates
that S(a, ri)-dominate ai, and that are not S(a, ri)-dominated. If D = ∅ then
gi(a) = {ai}. Otherwise:
• For a weak LD voter, gi(a) = D.
• For a strict LD voter, gi(a) = argmind∈D Qi(d).
In other words, a strict LD voter votes the most preferred candidate that
locally-dominates her current choice (if such exists). The definition of a weak
LD voter is much more permissive, and does not restrict the voter to select the
most preferred candidate in D.
Note that the definition looks identical to Def. 2 from the nonatomic model.
The only difference is that Si(a, ri) in the finite case depends on the identity (on
the current vote) of i, and not only on its type. Note however that gi depends
on ai both in the finite and nonatomic cases.
Definition 5 for strict local dominance almost coincides with the definition in
of local dominance in [15], but for one difference: We require D to only contain
undominated candidates whereas no such restriction appeared in [15]. Note that
without this restriction, a single voter can move, and then immediately move
again, which does not make much sense.
Characterization of LD moves We say that candidate c is a possible winner
for i in state a if there is a possible state where c wins. Formally, Wi(a) = {c ∈
M : ∃s′ ∈ Si(a, ri) s.t. f(s′, c) = c}.
Note that in contrast to the nonatomic case, different voters of the same
type may consider different sets of possible winners. This is the main advantage
of the nonatomic model.
It is easy to see that under the multiplicative distance c ∈Wi(a) iff sa−i(c) ≥
(1 + ri)
−2sa−i(f(s)). The full proof of Lemma 2 (in Appendix XI) that also
covers the finite voters case, for any candidate-wise metric.
The proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4 are the same for the finite case, one we replace
the notation S(a, ri) with Si(a, ri).
Convergence Recall that when several voters (in the finite case) may move
simultaneously, cycles may emerge even without uncertainty at all [17]. A simple
example is when s(a) = 1, s(b) = s(c) = 0, and we add two voters that favor b, c
to a. If they start by one voting to b and the other to c, then each time they
both play they will just switch locations.
The proof of Theorem 5 fails in the finite case where it uses the fact that
st
∗
(a′) ≥ st
∗
(a∗) = s∗ and thus the deserted candidate aj is a possible winner
for j. In the finite case this does not hold, since the high score of aj depends
on the vote of j, and j herself does not consider aj as a possible winner.
We next show that the theorem still holds once restricted to singleton moves.
That is, we consider all valid sequences a0, a1, . . . where at+1i ∈ gi(a
t) for some
voter i ∈ I, and at+1i = a
t
i for all other voters.
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As we can see, in the finite case we need to cover some more issues so the
proof is somewhat longer, despite the restriction to singleton moves.
Theorem 11. Any sequence of (singleton) weak LD moves is finite.
Proof. Clearly in the finite case every sequence is either finite or contains a
cycle. Assume, toward a contradiction, that there is a cyclic path (at)Tt=0. Let
R ⊆ M be all candidates that are part of the cycle, and let I(R) ⊆ I be the
voters that participate in the cycle.
Let s∗ be the lowest score of any candidate in R during the cycle. That is,
we find a∗ ∈ R and t∗ s.t. s∗ = st
∗
(a∗) is minimal.
By definition, s∗ = st
∗
(a∗) ≤ st(c) for all c ∈ R for every time t ≤ T .
Consider the next step where some voter j joins a∗ (w.l.o.g. at step t∗), and
pick an arbitrary voter j ∈ I s.t. a∗ = at
∗+1
j 6= a
t∗
j = aj (a voter that moved to
a∗). Thus at step t∗ there is a move aj
j
→ a∗ for some aj ∈ R.
By Lemma 4, a∗ is a possible winner for voter j, i.e., a∗ ∈ Wj(st
∗
). We
facilitate the notation by writing s−j = sa−j , which are the scores from the
point of view of j (i.e., omitting the vote of j).
Since st
∗
(a′) ≥ s∗ for all a′ ∈ R, in particular st
∗
−j(aj) + 1 ≥ s
∗. Suppose
first that st
∗
−j(aj) < s
∗. Then after the move st
∗+1(aj) = s
t∗
−j(aj) < s
∗, in
contradiction to the selection of s∗ (note that this only applies to singleton
moves, as no other voter can move to aj at time t
∗). Thus st
∗
−j(aj) ≥ s
∗ =
st
∗
−j(a
∗), which means that aj ∈ Wj(at
∗
). Note that for all other candidates c ∈
R \ {aj}, st
∗
−j(c) = s
t∗(c) ≥ s∗ as well, thus R ⊆Wj(st
∗
). The remainder of the
proof is almost identical to the nonatomic case, but we write it for completeness.
By Lemma 3, either aj is the least-preferred candidate for j in Wj(s
t∗)
(Cases I and II), or the third category of the lemma holds. We treat the latter
case separately (Case III), so assume aj is indeed the least-preferred in Wj(s
t∗).
Since R ⊆Wj(a
t∗), aj is the least-preferred in R as well.
There must be some step t∗∗ in the cycle where a voter of type vj moves
to aj (w.l.o.g. voter j). So in s
t∗∗ , aj is preferred by j to some other possible
winner z by Lemma 4. Since aj is the least-preferred in R, and aj ≻j z, z /∈ R.
Thus there is some z ∈Wj(st
∗∗
) \R such that z ≺j aj . Denote the (fixed) score
of z by s(z).
Case I: s(z) ≥ s∗. Consider again step t∗. Since s(z) ≥ s∗ = s−j(a∗) and
a∗ ∈ Wj(at
∗
), we have z ∈ Wj(at
∗
). Since aj is the least preferred possible
winner in t∗, we have that z ≻j aj , which is a contradiction.
Case II: s(z) < s∗. Denote d = at
∗∗
j , and consider the step d
j
→ aj at
time t∗∗. Since d ∈ R then st
∗∗
−j (d) ≥ s
∗ > s(z), and thus d ∈ Wj(at
∗∗
) (as
z ∈ Wj(at
∗∗
)). By Lemma 3 (category (b) or (c)), we have that aj ≻j d. This
is a contradiction since aj is the least-preferred in R.
Case III: The remaining case is when there is b ∈ Wj(at
∗
) s.t. aj ≻j b. Then
by category (c) of Lemma 3, a∗ ∈W0(at
∗
). However since a∗ has minimal score,
this means that R ⊆ W0(at
∗
), i.e., all candidates c ∈ R have the same score
st
∗
−j(c) = s
∗ at time t∗, and there is exactly one candidate (aj) that has the
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additional vote of voter j. Since throughout the cycle the score of candidates
in R may not drop below s∗, we have that all moves in the cycle are from the
single candidate ct ∈ R with score st(ct) = s∗ + 1 to a candidate with score s∗.
This means that the deserted candidate ct is always a possible winner for the
mover. Consequently, all of the moves in the cycle fall under categories (b) or
(c) of Lemma 3. Thus voters only vote for more preferred candidates, which
contradicts a cycle.
Best response and better response In [17] a distinction was made between
“better-response” (any move that improves the winner), “best-response” (any
move that leads to the selection of the best possible winner); and “unique best-
response” (or restricted best-response), which requires in addition that the voter
votes for the selected candidate. It was shown that only unique best-response
guarantees convergence, whereas cycles may occur under better-response. It
may thus seem that our result contradicts the one in [17].
However, a similar distinction can be made between “better-response” and
“restricted better-response”. In [16] it was shown that local-dominance natu-
rally restricts the response in a similar way—a candidate that is not a possible
winner is always dominated. In the special case of r = 0 the set D is exactly the
set of restricted better-responses. Thus it is not the restriction to best response
that leads to convergence, but rather the restriction to vote for the candidate
the voter is trying to promote.
The connection between local-dominance and restricted better-response for
r = 0 only holds in our neutral tie-breaking, but it is easy to verify that restricted
better-response converges also in the lexicographic tie-breaking model of [17].
IX Convergence and Acyclicity
Without restricting the resolution ǫ, there may be infinite acyclic paths, even
with two candidates and one type of voters. For example consider a population
where all voters prefer b over a, but initially all vote to a. That is, there is just
one type of voters and s0(a) = 1, s0(b) = 0. Suppose that in step t, half of the
remaining a voters are chosen to play, and move to b. This entails an infinite
acyclic path.
To avoid such infinite paths, and also to allow for more intuitive notation,
we assume that there is some bounded granularity level ǫ, and that sets of voters
of the same type with mass ǫ always move together.5
Thus a state a is ǫ-valid if a(v, c) is an integer multiple of ǫ, and a move from
state at to state at+1 is ǫ-valid, if (I): both states are ǫ-valid; (II) at+1 is attained
from at by taking each set i ∈ I, and set either at+1i = ai, or a
t+1
i ∈ gi(a).
Finally, for any ǫ > 0, there is only a finite number of ǫ-valid states. Thus
there cannot be cycles of infinite length.
5Note that this is different than a coalitional manipulation, where voters are coordinated.
It is possible that all voters will be less satisfied after the move.
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Observation 12. If a voting game has no finite cycles, then every ǫ-valid path,
for any ǫ > 0, is finite.
Finally, the assumption that all voter sets have the same size ǫ simplifies the
notation but is not necessary.
Clearly valid moves can be defined without referring to “identified” voters,
although the definition is quite tedious. Consider a valid finite cycle of states
(not necessarily ǫ-valid for any ǫ). Since there is a finite number of types and
a finite number of states in the cycle, we can still partition the voters [0, 1] to
subsets I, s.t. all voters in set i ∈ I have the same type vi and the same sequence
of actions a1i , . . . , a
T
i . Thus we get identified voters in retrospect. The mass of
each such set i ∈ I my not be rational so there may not be common unit size ǫ,
but our convergence proof works just the same.
X Voter influence
In the atomic case the meaning of f(s, c) is clear—it is the outcome of adding
one more vote to candidate c in state s. However changing the vote of a “single”
non-atomic voter does not change the score. We remedy this by assuming each
voter considers her own weight as tends to zero but not quite zero. Formally,
denote by s→cǫ the state that is attained from s if we add to s a mass of ǫ > 0
voters voting for c. That is, s→cǫ (c) = s(c) + ǫ, and s
→c
ǫ (b) = s(b) for any other
candidate.
Finally, we define (in the non-atomic case) the modified outcome f(s, c) as
limǫ→0 f(s
→c
ǫ ). To see that the limit is well defined, note that it is sufficient to
consider any 0 < ǫ < minb,c∈M |s(b)− s(c)|.
By continuity of the distance metric, if there are states where two different
candidates win, then there is also a state where they are tied. Thus voter i
believes she can affect the outcome if only if she can act as a tie-breaker between
candidates in some possible state. More formally, suppose that voter i votes i
in state s, and consider S = S(s, ri).
Lemma 13. 1. if f(s′) = c for all s′ ∈ S, then f(s′, ai) = c (that is, i cannot
change the outcome).
2. if several candidates C ⊆M are tied (with maximal score) in some s′, and
ai ∈ C, then f(s′, ai) = ai.
3. if several candidates C ⊆M are tied (with maximal score) in some s′, and
ai /∈ C, then any candidate in C wins in some state s′′ ∈ S.
Proof. 1. For all s′ ∈ S, s′(c) > s′(ai) + minb,c∈M |s(b) − s(c)| > s′(ai) + ǫ for
some ǫ > 0. Thus f(s′, ai) = limǫ→0 f(s
′→ai
ǫ ) = c.
2. For all c ∈ M \ {ai}, s′(ai) ≥ s′(c) and thus s′→aiǫ (ai) > s
′(ai) ≥ s′(c) =
s′→aiǫ (c).
3. For c ∈ C, consider the state s′′ where Q+
s
′′(c) = 1. Then the score of
ai in s
′′→ai
ǫ is strictly lower than the score of c, as in 1. Thus C have maximal
score in s′′→aiǫ , and c wins due to the tie-breaking advantage.
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XI Other Distance Functions
Candidate-wise distances
Lemma 2. Every pair of possible winners are tied for victory in some possible
state. Formally, for every b, c ∈Wi(s), there is s′ ∈ S(s, ri) s.t. b, c ∈W0(s′).
Proof for any candidate-wise distance. In this proof we denote the score of c by
s(c). Recall that δ(s, s′) = maxc δ
′(s(c), s′(c)).
Consider some b, c ∈ Wi(s). Let the score of all candidates except b, c be
s′(a) = min{z : ∀a /∈ {b, c}, δ′(s(a), z) ≤ ri}. Let h(b) = max{z : δ′(s(b), z) ≤
ri} and h(c) = max{z : δ′(s(c), z) ≤ ri}, then set s′(b) = s′(c) = min{h(b), h(c)}.
Then s′ ∈ S(s, ri) by definition. Also, we argue that b, c are tied with maxi-
mal score in s′. Indeed, since b ∈ Wi(s), we know that there is some state
sb ∈ S(s, ri) s.t. f(sb) = b. We know that sb(b) ≤ h(b), and sb(a) ≥ s
′(a) for all
other candidates. Since the same holds for c w.r.t. some state sc, we get that
in s′ either b or c have maximal score. However by construction s′(b) = s′(c) so
they are tied.
Note that the proof also covers the finite case.
As this is our only proof that makes use of the properties of the distance
function, all of our results hold for any candidate-wise distance.
Lemma 4. Consider an LD move ai
i
→ a′i. Then
1. a′i ∈Wi(s), and there is some c ∈ Wi(s) s.t. a
′
i ≻i c.
2. For a strict LD move, a′i = argminc∈Wi(a)Qi(c).
3. If ai /∈Wi(s), then |gi(s)| = 1 (thus weak and strict LD coincide).
Proof. Consider a∗i = argminc∈Wi(a)Qi(c). Clearly a
∗
i dominates any candidate
not in Wi(a), thus a
′
i ∈ Wi(s).
If there is only one possible winner, no action dominates any other action,
and there are no moves. The fact that a′i 6= ai entails that there is some
possible state where a′i is tied with some other possible winner c. If a
′
i is the
least preferred possible winner, then it is dominated by a∗i , which again means
there would be no move. This completes part 1.
Next for part 2. Consider the set of candidates D in Def. 2. Since a′i ∈ D,
it is non-empty. We get from part 1 that D ⊆Wi(a). It is left to show that a∗i
is in D, as this implies a∗i = a
′
i.
Indeed, assume that a′i 6= a
∗
i . By Lemma 2 and part 1, there is a state
s′ ∈ S(a, ri) where a∗i is tied for victory with some other possible winner c, and
Q+
s
′(c) = 1. Thus f(s′, a∗i ) = a
∗
i ≻i c = f(s
′, ai), which means a
∗
i S(s, ri)-beats
ai.
We consider the three categories of Lemma 3. (a) If ai /∈ Wi(s), then in every
s′ ∈ S(s, ri) voting for a∗i can only improve the outcome from f(s
′) ∈ Wi(a)
to a∗i ; (b) If ai is the worst possible winner, then ai does not beat any other
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candidate; (c) There is no uncertainty except on the tie-breaker (i.e. s′(c) = s(c)
for all c, but Q+
s
′ may differ), and a∗i , ai ∈ W0(s). Thus in any possible state
f(s′, a∗i ) = a
∗
i ≻i ai = f(s
′, ai). In all cases ai does not S(s, ri)-beat a
∗
i , and
thus a∗i ∈ D.
For the third part, if |Wi(s)| = 1, then i is non-pivotal and no action domi-
nates any other action. Thus gi(s) = {ai} (no move). Otherwise, consider some
b ∈ Wi(a) that is not a∗i . Then by Lemma 2 there is a possible state s
′ where
b, a∗ ∈ W0(s′) with Q
+
s
′(a∗i ) = 1. Then f(s
′, b) = b ≺i a∗i = f(s
′, ai), so ai beats
b, which means b cannot dominate ai, and thus b /∈ gi(s).
Non-candidate-wise distance functions
For general distance-based relations, the set of possible winners alone is insuffi-
cient to determine which pairs of candidates can be tied. That is, Lemma 2 is
violated, and thus our other proofs do not hold as well.
Under the ℓ1 distance, δ(s, s
′) =
∑
c∈M |s(c) − s
′(c)|. Consider for example
the ℓ1 metric, ri = 5, and four candidates {a, b, c, d} whose scores are s1 =
(10, 9, 7, 6). While all candidates are possible winners, the last two cannot be
tied for victory. However if scores are s2 = (10, 6, 6, 6) then every pair can be
tied.
It may still hold that voting games converge for other distance functions,
and we leave this as an open question for future research.
The example above can also demonstrate that cardinal utilities matter under
the WCR dynamics. Suppose that the utilities for the four candidates are
ui = (3, 4, 5, 0) (i.e. the third candidate is best, the fourth is worst). We can
compute the WCR of every candidate in by looking on all pairs that can be tied
for victory. In s2 we have WCRi(s, c) = max{4 − 0, 3 − 0} = 4, whereas the
WCR of any other action is 5. Thus c minimizes WCR. However in s1, the tie
between c, d is impossible. Thus WCR(s1, b) = max{3− 0, 5− 3} = 3, whereas
WCR(s1, c) = WCR(s2, c) = 4. Note that in this case the voter will not vote
for her most favorite candidate (c), even though it is a possible winner. Finally,
note that if we change u(d) to 2.5 (i.e., without changing ordinal preferences
Qi), then c is once again selected in s1 under WCR.
Thus whether voters are sensitive to cardinal utilities, strongly depends on
the uncertainty model we are assuming, and in particular on the distance func-
tion.
XII Regret Minimization
Lemma 7. Either |Wv(s)| = 1 (in which case all regrets are 0); or the unique
candidate minimizing WCRv(s, c) is a
∗ = argminc∈Wv(s)Qi(c).
Proof. If there is a unique possible winner d then the f(s′, b) = d for all s′ ∈
S(s, rv), b ∈ M , and thus WCRv(s, b) = 0. Thus suppose that a
∗, b ∈ Wv(s),
where b is the least-preferred for type v.
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We classify possible states into two classes S1, S2. If f(s
′, a∗) = a∗ we say
that s′ ∈ S1, and otherwise s′ ∈ S2.
In s′ ∈ S1, REGv(s′, a∗) = 0 ≤ REGv(s′, c) for all c ∈ M . Recall that
by Lemma 2, any two possible winners can be tied for victory. Thus in some
s′ ∈ S1, a
∗, b ∈ W0(s
′) and Q+
s
′(b) = 1. Then for any c 6= a∗, REGv(s
′, c) ≥
u(f(s′, a∗))− u(f(s′, c)) = u(a∗)− u(b).
In s′ ∈ S2, f(s′, a∗) = d 6= a∗, then d ∈W0(s′), Q
+
s
′(d) = 1, andREGv(s, a
∗) =
maxc′∈W0(s′) u(c
′) − u(d), since a voter can only bring about the election of a
candidate that is tied for victory. Thus REGv(s
′, a∗) ≤ |u(c′) − u(b)| for some
c′, b ∈W0(s′), c′ 6= a∗.
ThusWCRv(s, a
∗) ≤ |u(c′)−u(b)| for some c′ ∈ Wv(s), c 6= a∗, which means
that for all c ∈M , WCRv(s, a∗) < u(a∗)− u(b) ≤WCRv(s, c).
In [19], it is shown that a voter can calculate the expected utility of voting
for c, by averaging ui(c)−ui(b) over all candidates b, weighted by the probability
that b, c are tied. Lemma 7 demonstrates that under the regret minimization
scheme, voters apply similar logic (only consider possible ties). However instead
of taking a weighted average, the voter only considers the maximum.
Proposition 10. There is an example of a non-atomic voting game, where no
voting equilibrium exists under WCR dynamics.
Proof. There are 6 candidates, {a, b, c1, c2, c3, d}. We set the base scores of
candidates to s = (12, 6, 0, 0, 0, 12). That is, scores due to non-strategic voters.
We use the ℓ∞ norm.
We introduce four types of strategic voters: v and (wj)
3
j=1. The preferences
are Qv : b ≻ a ≻ ci ≻ d for all i, and Qwj : cj ≻ b ≻ a ≻ d ≻ ci for i 6= j.
We also set rv = 2, rw = 6. There are 1.5 units of type v voters, and 1.2 units
of each type wj voters. We note that under the ℓ∞ metric, Wr(s) contains all
candidates whose score is at least s(f(s))− 2r. Also note that the total mass of
all voters is 5.1.
We show that in any profile a there is some WCR move. We denote by xe,
e ∈ M the fraction of voters (of any type) voting for candidate e in a. We
observe that s(a) ≤ 12 + 5.1 < 18 ≤ s(b) + 2rw, thus b is always a possible
winner for type wj voters.
1. If there are type wj voters on d, a or ci (i 6= j), they prefer b, since
b ∈Ww(a) and b ≻w d, a, ci.
2. Similarly, if there are type v voters on d or any ci, they prefer a (w.l.o.g.
there are no type w agents on d, so a ∈ Wv(a)).
3. A type v voter votes for b if b ∈ Wv(a) and otherwise for a.
4. A type wj voter votes for cj if cj ∈Ww(a) and otherwise for b.
Assume toward a contradiction that a is an equilibrium under WCR. We know
by 1 and 2 that xd = 0, xcj ≤ 1.2 for all j. We observe that b ∈ Wv(a) iff the
inequality in 6+xb+ rv = s(b)+ rv ≥ s(a)− rv = 12+xa− rv holds. That is, iff
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xb ≥ xa + 12− 6− 4 = xa +2. Similarly, cj ∈ Ww(a) iff s(cj) + rw ≥ s(a)− rw,
which means iff xcj ≥ xa.
Suppose first that b ∈ Wv(a). Then all type v voters are on b, which means
xa = 0, xb ≥ 1.5. This entails that cj ∈Ww(a) for all j, since xcj ≥ 0 = xa. We
conclude that all wj voters are on cj , which means xb ≤ 1.5. However we get
that
s(b) = s(b) + xb ≤ 6 + 1.5 = 7.5 < 8 = s(a)− 2rv,
so we get that b /∈Wv(a). A contradiction.
Thus suppose that b /∈ Wv(a). Then all type v voters are on a, which
means xa = 1.5 > xcj for all j. This entails that cj /∈ Ww(a) for all j, since
xa = 1.5 > 1.2 ≥ xcj . We conclude that all wj voters are on b, which means
xb ≥ 3.6. However we get that
s(b) = s(b) + xb ≥ 6 + 3.6 = 9.6 > 9.5 = s(a)− 2rv,
so we get that b ∈Wv(a). A contradiction again.
Proposition 14. There is an example of a atomic population V with four
candidates, where no voting equilibrium exists under WCR dynamics.
Proof. We set the base scores of candidates to s = (9, 4, 0, 10). That is, scores
due to non-strategic voters. We use the ℓ∞ norm.
We introduce two strategic voters i and j. The preferences are Qi : b ≻ a ≻
c ≻ d, Qj : c ≻ b ≻ a ≻ d, with lexicographic tie-breaking over candidates. We
set the uncertainty levels to ri = 1, rj = 4. Thus a candidate is in Wi if it needs
more 3 votes (including i) to win, and in Wj if it needs more 9 votes.
We first show that there is a cycle
a1 = (b, c)
i
→ a2 = (a, c)
j
→ a3 = (a, b)
i
→ a4 = (b, b)
j
→ (b, c) = a1.
We can write the same cycle in terms of score vectors:
s1 = (9, 5, 1,9)
i
→ s2 = (10,4, 1,9)
j
→ s3 = (10, 5, 0,9)
i
→ s4 = (9,6,0,9)
j
→ (9, 5, 1, 9) = s1.
We justify the moves as follows by Lemma 7 and the following observations
for each move: (1) b /∈Wi(s1) but i is pivotal between a, d; (2) c /∈Wj(s2) since
s(a) = 6, but j is pivotal between b, a; (3) b ∈ Wi(s3); (4) c ∈ Wj(s4) since
s(a) = 5.
Note that the third move by agent i cannot be an LD move, since b does not
dominate a.
Also, all other profiles are never stable: d is the last candidate of both voters
and thus has maximal regret in every state, so no voter votes for d. Voter i never
votes for c since it is never a possible winner. Voter j never votes for a since b
is always a possible winner and b ≻j a.
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XIII Problematic Proof in [15]
Proposition 5.5 in [15] states that from any initial state in voting games with
a finite population, there is some path that converges to an equilibrium. More
specifically, that if opportunity (moves to a more preferred candidate) moves
always precede compromise moves then convergence is guaranteed. The Propo-
sition extends this claim to subsets of agents that move simultaneously, provided
that eventually enough singleton steps occur. The proof is omitted from [15],
but appears in the full version [16].
Ignoring the complications of simultaneous moves, the proof shows that after
the first time there are no opportunity moves, then the score of the winner must
monotonically increase until convergence. This relies on the observation from
a previous proof (about convergence from the truthful state) that only voters
who vote for candidates who cannot win may move. However this observation
is no longer true with arbitrary initial state.
Consider the following example. Four candidates {a, b, c, d} with fixed scores
(5, 3, 4, 1). We add two voters with r = 2 (we use ℓ1 metric, but similar examples
can be constructed for any metric). i prefers c ≻ a ≻ b ≻ d. j prefers d ≻ a ≻
b ≻ c. Initially i votes for a and j votes for d.
There are no opportunity moves since c does not dominate a for i (if i moves,
b may win with additional two votes). Thus the first step is by j who deserts
d and goes to a. Now b is no longer a possible winner, and a is dominated (for
i) by c. Thus in the next step i does an opportunity move and the score of the
winner decreases.
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